Southern District Of New York Dismisses “Truly Novel” Restraint Of Trade Theory In Pharmaceutical Antitrust Action
On October 8, 2019, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York Ronnie Abrams dismissed all but one claim in a putative antitrust class action brought against Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Ltd. and various Takeda entities, as well as generic manufacturers Teva Pharmaceuticals, Ranbaxy Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., Actavis PLC, and Mylan Inc. In re: Actos Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, No. 1:15-cv-03278 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2019). The class complaint alleged that Takeda illegally conspired with the other defendants to delay generic competition for its blockbuster diabetes drug Actos through a series of patent settlement agreements, which granted the other defendants non-exclusive licenses to produce generic Actos at a future date prior to the expiration of Takeda’s patents. The Court dismissed these conspiracy claims, finding that plaintiffs’ “truly novel” theory for why the settlement agreements between Takeda and the other defendants violated the antitrust laws lacked “even a colorable basis” of support. The Court’s decision left in place one remaining claim against Takeda for monopolization.
Southern District of New York Dismisses Putative Antitrust Class Action Finding Plaintiffs Failed To Plead Defendants Transacted Business Of A “Substantial Character” In New York
On October 4, 2019, District Judge Edgardo Ramos of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed a putative antitrust class action against certain defendants, foreign banks, and individuals for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. In re SSA Bonds Antitrust Litig., No. 16 CIV. 3711 (ER) 2019 WL 4917608 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2019). Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant financial institutions and certain employees operating as dealers in the U.S. dollar SSA bond market conspired to fix the price of SSA bonds in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Several dealer defendants (the “Foreign Dealer Defendants”) and four of their employees (the “Individual Defendants”) moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and venue. The Court granted the motion, finding that plaintiffs had not satisfied the venue provision of the Clayton Act because plaintiffs failed to show that the Foreign Dealer Defendants transacted business of a “substantial character” in New York and failed to establish a nexus for purposes of personal jurisdiction “between the alleged business transactions in New York and the claims of this antitrust case.”
Seventh Circuit Closes Chapter On Creditor Price Fixing Claims Against Bankruptcy Software Provider
On September 5, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a decision by the Northern District of Illinois dismissing Illinois state antitrust claims brought by a bankruptcy creditor against the bankruptcy trustee’s software services provider. McGarry & McGarry, LLC v. Bankr. Mgt. Sols., Inc., 18-2619, 2019 WL 4197546 (7th Cir. Sept. 5, 2019). Plaintiff alleged that defendant entered into a price-fixing conspiracy with other bankruptcy software providers. Judge Diane S. Sykes, writing for a unanimous panel, ruled that plaintiff lacked antitrust standing because it did not meaningfully participate in the relevant market for bankruptcy software services and, accordingly, its alleged injury was too remote from the claimed price-fixing violation.
Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal Of Price Fixing Claims Against Oil Companies
On August 29, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an Opinion and Summary Order affirming the dismissal of plaintiffs-appellant derivatives traders’ Sherman Act and Commodities Exchange Act claims against defendant-appellees oil companies. Prime International Trading, Ltd., et al. v. BP PLC, et al., No. 1:17-cv-2233 (2d Cir. 2019).
Second Circuit Reverses District Court’s Dismissal Of Metal Purchasers’ Antitrust Claims
On August 27, 2019, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a grant of summary judgment by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which had dismissed the claims of a group of aluminum buyers on grounds they did not have standing in an antitrust suit alleging a conspiracy to artificially inflate aluminum prices. Judge Pierre N. Leval, writing for the panel, disagreed with the District Court’s dismissal, ruled that plaintiffs had adequately pleaded antitrust injury, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Henry Bath LLC, 16-4230, 2019 WL 4018285 (2d Cir. Aug. 27, 2019).
District of Columbia Circuit Pulls The Brake On Class Certification Bid In Railroad Price-Fixing Suit
On August 16, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed a lower court’s decision to deny class certification in an antitrust action involving some of the country’s largest freight railroad companies. In Re: Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 1869, (D.C. Cir. Aug. 16, 2019). Plaintiffs alleged that defendants conspired to fix rate-based fuel surcharges in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Section 4 of the Clayton Act and various state laws. The panel, which consisted of Chief Judge Merrick Garland and Judges Judith Rogers and Gregory Katsas, held that class certification was inappropriate because plaintiffs’ regression analysis did not establish predominance.
Eastern District Of Michigan Slices No-Poach Antitrust Claims Against Pizza Franchise
On July 29, 2019, Judge David M. Lawson of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed, with prejudice, antitrust claims stemming from a fast-food pizza franchise’s use of “no-poach” hiring agreements in its standard franchise contracts. Judge Lawson determined that plaintiff, who did not attempt to advance a rule of reason antitrust claim, had not pled a viable per se or quick look antitrust violation. Moreover, plaintiff did not plausibly allege that the no-poach agreements caused him a cognizable antitrust injury. Ogden v. Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc., No. 18-12792, 2019 WL 3425266 (E.D. Mich. July 29, 2019).
D.C. Circuit Grounds Competition Challenge To FAA Regulations For Lack Of Standing
On August 2, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed an airline technology company’s petitions for review of regulations that petitioner alleged both restricted competition for airport flight slots and limited petitioner’s market opportunity for lack of standing. Exhaustless Inc. v. FAA, Case No. 18-1304 (D.C. Cir. 2019). The panel—Judges Karen Henderson, Sri Srinivasan and Cornelia Pillard—ruled that petitioner failed to show that it was injured or would incur injury from the Federal Aviation Association’s regulations limiting the number of flights out of LaGuardia and JFK Airports.
Central District Of California Gives Poor Review To Movie Rental Antitrust Claims
On July 17, 2019, Judge Dean D. Pregerson of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California dismissed antitrust claims alleging that a major media and entertainment conglomerate unlawfully restrained trade in the nationwide market for rentals and sales of movies on DVD, Blu-ray and digital platforms. Judge Pregerson determined that plaintiff had not met its pleading burden; specifically, it did not adequately allege market power or anticompetitive effects in the relevant market. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc., CV 18-00677-DDP (AGRx), 2019 WL 3237376 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2019).
Central District Of California Finds Clothing Rental Company’s Antitrust Claims All Style, No Substance
On June 24, 2019, Judge George H. Wu of the United States District Court for the Central District of California granted a defendant clothing rental company’s motion to dismiss antitrust claims brought under California’s Cartwright Act, as well as other state-law claims brought by a competing clothing rental company. FashionPass, Inc. v. Rent the Runway, Inc., No. 19-cv-3537-CG(JCx) (June 24, 2019). Plaintiff alleged that defendant interfered with and intentionally caused certain clothing suppliers to cancel their contracts with, and refuse to supply, plaintiff in violation of the Cartwright Act and California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). Plaintiff also brought tort claims for intentional interference with contract and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage based on the same alleged conduct. The Court dismissed the complaint in full, finding that plaintiff failed to plead a primary violation of the Cartwright Act, because the complaint did not identify any harm to the market or to competition generally, but instead pleaded only harm to plaintiff itself.
Eastern District Of Michigan Allows Sherman Act Suit Based On Employee No-Poach Agreement To Proceed
On May 24, 2019, Judge Victoria A. Roberts of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied defendant Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC’s and other related Domino’s corporate entities’ motion to dismiss, finding that plaintiff, an employee of one of defendants’ franchisees, had adequately alleged a no-poach agreement in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Blanton v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC, No. 18-13207 (E.D. Mich. May 24, 2019). The Court also found that plaintiff plausibly pleaded that defendants’ fraudulently concealed their conduct such that the Sherman Act’s four-year statute of limitations was tolled.
In Case Against Major Technology Corporation, United States Supreme Court Holds Mobile Phone Owners Have Antitrust Standing To Bring Claims Against Operator Of Application Store
On May 13, 2019, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed a Ninth Circuit decision reversing a California District Court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ antitrust claims on grounds that plaintiffs could not sue defendant because they were not direct purchasers from defendant. The 5-4 majority opinion written by Justice Kavanaugh held that plaintiffs—owners of mobile phones produced and sold by defendant—were direct purchasers because they bought applications directly from defendant’s application store. Thus, as injured buyers under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, plaintiffs were not barred from suing defendant on claims that defendant monopolized the retail market for the sale of its phone applications and exploited this position to overcharge consumers. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, No. 17-204 (U.S. May 13, 2019).
Northern District Of California Rejects Claim Of Bi-Coastal Conspiracy To Eliminate Restaurant Tipping
On January 7, 2019, Judge Jeffrey S. White of the Northern District of California ruled on a motion to dismiss allegations that certain high-end restaurant groups in New York and California had conspired to terminate the practice of tipping in restaurants, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and various state laws. Judge White held that plaintiff’s claims were too speculative to sustain an inference that defendants could — or had any reason to — conspire, and dismissed all claims. Brown v. 140 NM LLC et al., No. 4:17-cv-05782 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2019).
Oregon District Court Allows Claim Against Association Of Colleges And Universities To Proceed And Accepts Harm To Defendant’s Members As Evidence Of Antitrust Injury
On November 28, 2018, Judge Marco A. Hernández of the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, on remand from the Ninth Circuit, reversed its prior grant of a motion to dismiss and held that plaintiff — which brought antitrust conspiracy claims against a non-profit corporation made up of 549 member colleges — sufficiently demonstrated antitrust injury by alleging harm to the member colleges. CollegeNET, Inc. v. The Common Application, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-00771-HZ (D. Or. Nov. 28, 2018).
District Of New Jersey Denies Class Certification Based On Presence Of Uninjured Class Members In Proposed Class
On October 30, 2018, Judge Madeline C. Arleo of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey declined to certify a proposed consumer class in litigation accusing a pharmaceutical manufacturer (the “Company”) of maintaining a monopoly for two of its drugs. Judge Arleo held that, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class cannot be certified when a non-trivial portion of class members were not injured, absent some “reasonable and workable plan” to segregate those members from the rest of the class. In re Thalomid and Revlimid Antitrust Litig., No. 2:14-cv-06997, at *26, *29 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2018) (“Opinion”). In so holding, Judge Arleo relied heavily on the First Circuit’s recent decision in In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., which reversed a district court’s approval of a class on similar grounds. No. 18-1065, 2018 WL 4958856, at *11 (1st Cir. Oct. 15, 2018); https://www.lit-antitrust.shearman.com/first-circuit-reverses-class-certification-based.
First Circuit Reverses Class Certification Based On Presence Of Uninjured Class Members In Certified Class
On October 15, 2018, the United Stated Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in an opinion by Judge William J. Kayatta, reversed a district court’s certification of a class of indirect purchasers of the drug Asacol, holding that, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class cannot be certified when a non-trivial portion of class members were not injured in fact, absent some “reasonable and workable plan” to segregate those members from the rest of the class. In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., No. 18-1065, 2018 WL 4958856, at *11 (1st Cir. Oct. 15, 2018).
U.S. District Court For The Northern District Of California Rejects Class Certification Of Indirect Purchasers In Lithium Ion Battery Price-Fixing Litigation Based On Plaintiffs’ Failure To Address Focal Point Pricing
On March 5, 2018, Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denied class certification for a group of indirect purchasers alleging price fixing in the sale of lithium batteries, holding that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they had a reliable method of proving pass-through of the alleged overcharges on a class-wide basis. In so holding, the Court relied primarily on the plaintiffs’ expert’s failure to account for the effects of “focal point pricing,” the practice of pricing consumer products at certain attractive retail price points, for example, $799 or $1299.