Maryland District Court Denies DOJ’s Attempt To Halt Merger Based On Competition For A Single NSA Contract
On October 11, 2022, Judge Catherine C. Blake of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the U.S. Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) motion to preliminarily enjoin the $440 million acquisition of a company with expertise in specialized software development, cyber, and analytics by a larger consulting firm. Ruling that DOJ failed to show that the proposed transaction would cause anticompetitive harm in violation of federal antitrust laws, the Court was unwilling to grant the “extraordinary remedy” of blocking the merger and permitted the parties to close the transaction. United States v. Booz Allen Hamilton Inc. et al., No. 1:22-cv-01603 (D. Md. Oct. 11, 2022).
Seventh Circuit Reverses Dismissal Of Monopolization Claim, Holding That Plaintiff Adequately Pled A Relevant Geographic Healthcare Market Under The “Hypothetical Monopolist” Test
On July 8, 2022, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of a monopolization claim against an integrated healthcare provider, concluding that plaintiff had pled facts sufficient to support a plausible geographic market as required to establish a claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act. Vasquez v. Indiana Univ. Health, Inc., No. 21-3109, 2022 WL 2582368 (7th Cir. July 8, 2022).
Northern District Of California Dismisses Sherman Act Complaint Against Platform Operator Based On Implausible Single-Brand Market Definitions And Failure To Allege Harm To Competition
On November 30, 2021, Judge Edward M. Chen of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed a putative class action alleging that the defendant smartphone supplier’s contracts with mobile application (“apps”) developers and related guidelines violate Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act based on plaintiffs’ failure to allege a plausible relevant market or that they suffered antitrust harm. Judge Chen also dismissed plaintiffs’ breach of contract, RICO, and fraud claims. Coronavirus Reporter v. Apple Inc., No. 21-cv-05567-EMC (N.D. Cal. 2021).
Northern District Of California Finds That Antitrust Claims Against Technology Platform Fail While California’s Unfair Competition Law Supports Limited Injunction
On September 10, 2021, Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California issued her post-trial decision in Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR (N. D. Cal. 2021). Plaintiff claimed that defendant’s developer policies violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and the Cartwright Act, California’s analogue to the Sherman Act, as well as California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). The Court, in a 185-page opinion, found that plaintiff did not meet its burden to show that defendant’s policies violated the antitrust laws and denied plaintiff the broad injunction that would have required substantial changes to defendant’s App Store business. However, the Court held that plaintiff was entitled to a limited injunction under the UCL as to defendant’s anti-steering restrictions. The Court also granted contract damages for defendant’s counterclaims against plaintiff.
Western District Of Pennsylvania Dismisses Antitrust Action For Failure To Adequately Define A Product Market
On June 29, 2021, the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed Multiple Energy Technologies, LLC’s (“Plaintiff”) Second Amended Complaint against Under Armour, Inc. (“Defendant”) for failure to adequately plead a relevant product market and granted Plaintiff leave to amend its complaint. Multiple Energy Techs., LLC v. Under Armour, Inc., No. 2:20-CV-664-NR, 2021 WL 2661827 (W.D. Pa. June 29, 2021). The Court found that a sufficient product market definition requires pleading facts that allege: (1) high elasticity among all products within the alleged market; and (2) low elasticity between products within the alleged market and products outside the alleged market.
Dual Facebook Enforcement Actions Dismissed In District Of Columbia
On June 28, 2021, Judge James E. Boasberg of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed dual enforcement actions brought by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the attorneys general of 46 states and the District of Columbia (the “state enforcers”) against Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”). See FTC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03590-JEB (D.D.C. June 28, 2021), ECF 73 (the “FTC Action”); State of New York et al. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03589-JEB (D.D.C. June 28, 2021), ECF 137 (the “States’ Action”).
Monopolization Complaint Dismissed For Failure To Adequately Define The Relevant Product Market Or Plead Anticompetitive Conduct
On May 13, 2021, U.S. District Judge Beth Labson Freeman of the Northern District of California dismissed, with leave, to amend a monopolization claim against Google and its parent company for failure to properly define the relevant product market or to adequately plead anticompetitive conduct. In re Google Digital Advertising Antitrust Litigation, No. 20-CV-03556-BLF (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2021).
California District Court Rules Antitrust Claims Against Hollywood Foreign Press Don’t Make Final Cut
On March 23, 2021, Judge Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr. of the United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed amended antitrust claims brought by two entertainment journalists against the Hollywood Foreign Press Association (“HFPA”). Flaa v. Hollywood Foreign Press Ass’n, No. 2:20-cv-06974-SB (C.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2021).
Revised Market Definition For Patents Still Fails To State Plausible Claims Against Investment Manager
On January 6, 2020, Judge Edward M. Chen of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. Intel Corp., et al. v. Fortress Investment Group LLC, et al., No. 19-cv-07651-EMC (N. D. Ca. 2021). Plaintiffs alleged that defendants conspired to aggregate and assert essential patents against plaintiffs, which harmed competition in 13 alleged markets for patented technologies. Plaintiffs asserted this conduct violated Sherman Act § 1, Clayton Act § 7, as well as unfair competition law under state and FTC statutes. The Court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice as to the FTC Act claim as well as the other claims as they related to several product markets. It dismissed without prejudice claims as to the other markets to the extent plaintiffs could further amend their claims.
Northern District Of California Engages In Tech Companies’ Fortnite Battle
On October 9, 2020, Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted in part and denied in part Epic Games’ motion for preliminary injunction against Apple, Inc. Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc. , No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR (N. D. Cal. 2020). Plaintiff Epic Games (“Epic”) sought to reinstate its popular video game, Fortnite, to the Apple App Store and to regain its access to Apple’s developer tools. The Court declined to reinstate Fortnite to Apple’s App Store, but ordered Apple to allow Epic’s corporate affiliates access to its developer tools.
Tech Startup’s Antitrust Claims Against Professional Networking Site Don’t Get The Job Done
On September 9, 2020, Judge Edward Chen of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed antitrust claims brought against LinkedIn by a tech startup that alleged LinkedIn exploited its monopoly power to deny the startup access to essential information it uses in providing analytics services. hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., No. 17-cv-03301-EMC (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2020).
Northern District Of Georgia Allows Sherman Act Tying Scheme Claims To Proceed
On April 14, 2020, Judge Timothy C. Batten Sr. of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia denied a motion to dismiss Shearman Act claims against defendant CargoSprint, LLC and its founder. PayCargo, LLC v. CargoSprint, LLC, No. 3:19-CV-85-TCB, 2020 WL 1861928 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 14, 2020). Plaintiff, a competing provider of electronic payment management services to freight and cargo carriers and shippers, alleged that defendants violated antitrust laws by tying the use of one of their products to the purchase of another. Judge Batten denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, rejecting defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s amended complaint contained only conclusory allegations regarding the tying arrangement.
Southern District Of New York Sinks Sync Licensing Claims
On January 29, 2020, Judge Denise Cote of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted a group of music publishers’ motion to dismiss antitrust and tortious interference claims. Downtown Music Publishing LLC et al. v. Peloton Interactive Inc., No. 1:19-cv-02426 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). Defendant Peloton brought counterclaims alleging that the National Music Publishers’ Association, Inc. (“NMPA”) and its members (collectively, “plaintiffs”) had engaged in anticompetitive behavior including the refusal to deal with Peloton by denying sync licenses for music to be used in its exercise classes. The Court dismissed defendant Peloton’s antitrust counterclaims for failure to state a claim due to lack of proper market definition and declined to allow Peloton an option to amend its relevant market allegations.
Eastern District Of Michigan Slices No-Poach Antitrust Claims Against Pizza Franchise
On July 29, 2019, Judge David M. Lawson of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed, with prejudice, antitrust claims stemming from a fast-food pizza franchise’s use of “no-poach” hiring agreements in its standard franchise contracts. Judge Lawson determined that plaintiff, who did not attempt to advance a rule of reason antitrust claim, had not pled a viable per se or quick look antitrust violation. Moreover, plaintiff did not plausibly allege that the no-poach agreements caused him a cognizable antitrust injury. Ogden v. Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc., No. 18-12792, 2019 WL 3425266 (E.D. Mich. July 29, 2019).
Central District Of California Gives Poor Review To Movie Rental Antitrust Claims
On July 17, 2019, Judge Dean D. Pregerson of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California dismissed antitrust claims alleging that a major media and entertainment conglomerate unlawfully restrained trade in the nationwide market for rentals and sales of movies on DVD, Blu-ray and digital platforms. Judge Pregerson determined that plaintiff had not met its pleading burden; specifically, it did not adequately allege market power or anticompetitive effects in the relevant market. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc., CV 18-00677-DDP (AGRx), 2019 WL 3237376 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2019).
Central District Of California Finds Clothing Rental Company’s Antitrust Claims All Style, No Substance
On June 24, 2019, Judge George H. Wu of the United States District Court for the Central District of California granted a defendant clothing rental company’s motion to dismiss antitrust claims brought under California’s Cartwright Act, as well as other state-law claims brought by a competing clothing rental company. FashionPass, Inc. v. Rent the Runway, Inc., No. 19-cv-3537-CG(JCx) (June 24, 2019). Plaintiff alleged that defendant interfered with and intentionally caused certain clothing suppliers to cancel their contracts with, and refuse to supply, plaintiff in violation of the Cartwright Act and California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). Plaintiff also brought tort claims for intentional interference with contract and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage based on the same alleged conduct. The Court dismissed the complaint in full, finding that plaintiff failed to plead a primary violation of the Cartwright Act, because the complaint did not identify any harm to the market or to competition generally, but instead pleaded only harm to plaintiff itself.
United States District Court For The Eastern District of New York Rejects One-Sided Market And Single-Brand Market Definitions In Credit Card Antitrust Litigation
On January 14, 2019, Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted defendant American Express’ motion for summary judgment as to three of the four relevant markets proposed by the plaintiffs in their antitrust challenge to the “anti-steering” provisions in American Express’s merchant contracts. In re American Express Anti-Steering Rules Antitrust Litigation, No. 11-MD-2221 (NGG) (RER) (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2019). Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in a parallel challenge to the same contractual provisions by the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and several states, Ohio v. American Express Company, 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018), Judge Garaufis rejected the retail merchant plaintiffs’ proposed product market definitions that were limited to the merchant side of card transactions, i.e., the “one-sided” markets, finding that the Supreme Court’s decision required an examination of competition on both sides of the credit card platform – the cardholder side and the merchant side – i.e., the “two-sided” market. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to limit the relevant product market to American Express card transactions (the “Amex-only market”) because other general purpose credit and charge cards are reasonably interchangeable with American Express cards and therefore in the same relevant product market. American Express did not move for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ two-sided, all general purpose credit card market definition, and the case will proceed to trial on that theory.
Oregon District Court Allows Claim Against Association Of Colleges And Universities To Proceed And Accepts Harm To Defendant’s Members As Evidence Of Antitrust Injury
On November 28, 2018, Judge Marco A. Hernández of the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, on remand from the Ninth Circuit, reversed its prior grant of a motion to dismiss and held that plaintiff — which brought antitrust conspiracy claims against a non-profit corporation made up of 549 member colleges — sufficiently demonstrated antitrust injury by alleging harm to the member colleges. CollegeNET, Inc. v. The Common Application, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-00771-HZ (D. Or. Nov. 28, 2018).
, Antitrust Standing
, Attempted Monopolization
, Exclusionary Conduct
, Group Boycott
, Horizontal Restraints
, Joint Venture
, Market Definition
, Nascent Competition
, Sherman Act § 1
, Sherman Act § 2
District Of Columbia Releases Redacted Opinion Detailing Reasoning Behind Decision To Grant Preliminary Injunction In Tronox-Cristal Acquisition
On September 5, 2018, Judge Trevor N. McFadden of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the Federal Trade Commission’s request for a preliminary injunction preventing Tronox Ltd. (“Tronox”) from completing its proposed $2.4 billion acquisition of National Titanium Dioxide Company Ltd. (“Cristal”) until after a final ruling in the FTC’s administrative proceedings challenging the deal. Federal Trade Commission v. Tronox Ltd., et al., 1:18-cv-01622 (TNM) (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2018).Tronox intends to appeal and will consider whether to proceed with a divestiture to resolve potential competitive concerns.
United States Supreme Court Upholds Rejection Of The Government’s Antitrust Challenge To American Express’s Merchant Contracts
On June 25, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision by Justice Thomas, held that provisions in American Express Company’s (“American Express” or “Amex”) and its operating subsidiary’s contracts with merchants that restricted the ability of these merchants to steer customers to other credit or charge cards did not violate the Sherman Act. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 585 U.S. __, slip op. at 1 (2018). The Court held that plaintiffs—the United States Department of Justice and the Attorneys General of several states—failed to satisfy their burden of proving anticompetitive effects in the relevant market under the rule of reason. Id. at 10. The ruling has important implications for antitrust analysis, not only for the credit card industry, but for other industries that operate in two-sided markets where firms must compete simultaneously for different groups of customers whose demands are distinct but deeply interrelated.
U.S. District Court For The District Of New Jersey Dismisses Class Action For Failure To Identify Concerted Action And Relevant Market
On January 9, 2018, Judge William J. Martini of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed with prejudice a putative class action brought by a purchaser of Jaguar vehicles against Jaguar Land Rover North America LLC, Jaguar Land Rover Limited (collectively, the “manufacturer defendants”), their dealers, and a third-party consulting company. Baar v. Jaguar Land Rover North Am., LLC, et al
., No. 2:17-04142 (D.N.J. Jan. 9, 2018). Plaintiff alleged that defendants unreasonably restrained trade by implementing and enforcing a no-export agreement that prohibited purchasers from reselling Jaguar’s vehicles abroad for at least one year. The Court held that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a violation of federal or state antitrust laws because it did not adequately allege (1) concerted action among the defendants, or (2) that Jaguar’s no-export policy produced anticompetitive effects within a cognizable antitrust product and geographic market.
United States District Court For The District Of Maryland Grants Summary Judgment To Non-Practicing Entity Intellectual Ventures Against Monopolization Counterclaims Alleging Sham Patent Litigation
On November 30, 2017, Judge Paul W. Grimm of the United States District Court for the Southern Division of the District of Maryland granted Intellectual Ventures (“IV”) and affiliates’ motion for summary judgment on Capital One’s antitrust counterclaims based on IV’s alleged bad faith assertion of patent claims, concluding that Capital One’s antitrust counterclaims were barred by both Noerr-Pennington
immunity and collateral estoppel. Intellectual Ventures I LLC et al v. Capital One Financial Corp.
, 8-14-cv-00111 (MDD 2017-12-01, Order). The Court’s thorough and careful opinion is a good illustration of the challenges of litigation over the conduct of a non-practicing patent-assertion entity, or as some would have it, a patent troll, under the Sherman Act.
Sixth Circuit Holds That Homeowners Stated A Plausible Tying Claim Against Neighborhood Developers For Tying Purchase Of Telecommunications Services To The Sale Of Homes
On October 30, 2017, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed a district court’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion to file an amended complaint alleging that the defendants—a group of affiliated real estate development companies—illegally used their alleged market power in the sale of homes in three centrally planned neighborhoods to force the plaintiffs to purchase telecommunication services from another defendant, Crystal Clear Technologies, LLC, a telecommunications company that the developers owned and controlled. Cates v. Crystal Clear Technologies, LLC,
No. 16-6714 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 2017). The majority affirmed, however, the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claim that the arrangement between Crystal Clear and the defendant developers violated the Federal Communications Commission’s “Exclusivity Order” (In the Matter of Exclusive Service Contracts For Provision Of Video Services In Multiple Dwelling Units and Other Real Estate Developments,
22 FCC Rcd. 20235, 20251 (2007), 47 C.F.R. § 76.2000(a)), which prohibits cable television distributors from entering into exclusive contracts to provide video programming, on the grounds that the complaint and contracts themselves contradicted the allegation that the contracts were in fact exclusive.
9th Circuit Upholds Grant Of Summary Judgment In Favor Of UPS And FedEx In Antitrust Suit Brought By Third-Party Shipping Rate Consultant
On August 21, 2017, in an unpublished, split panel decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed U.S. District Judge Jesus G. Bernal’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of UPS and FedEx on AFMS LLC’s antitrust suit under § 1 of the Sherman Act. AFMS, a firm that offered rate negotiation and consulting services for package shippers, alleged that UPS and FedEx conspired to boycott third-party consultants such as AFMS who negotiated rates for their customers, including by threatening to discontinue the rate discounts for any shippers who continued to use intermediaries. After providing AFMS with three opportunities to amend its complaint, the U.S. District Court finally dismissed the claims with prejudice in April 2015 because AFMS had not properly defined a market impacted by the alleged agreement.
Southern District Of New York Dismisses Oil Price Manipulation Claims Based On Failure To Adequately Allege Antitrust Injury Linked To Defendants’ Alleged Conduct
On June 8, 2017, Judge Andrew L. Carter of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted defendant energy companies’ motion to dismiss claims brought by two putative classes of derivatives traders and landowners, finding that plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege that they suffered an antitrust injury linked to defendants’ alleged conduct in the relevant markets. In re: North Sea Brent Crude Oil Futures Litigation
, Case No. 1:13-md-02475 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 8, 2017). Plaintiffs, a putative class of landholding interests in U.S. oil-producing property and a putative class of futures and derivatives traders, alleged that defendants conspired to intentionally manipulate Brent crude oil prices and the prices of Brent crude oil futures and derivatives contracts traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange (“NYMEX”) and the Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE Futures Europe”) in violation of the Sherman Act (as well as other federal and state laws). Brent crude is crude oil pulled from the North Sea region of Europe. In dismissing the Sherman Act claims, the district court found that plaintiffs had not suffered any antitrust injury, and therefore did not have standing as plaintiffs under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.