District Of New Jersey Denies Summary Judgment On Robinson-Patman Rebates Claims
On April 1, 2019, Judge William J. Martini of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment in a Robinson-Patman Act suit. Marjam Supply Co. v. Firestone Building Products Co. LLC, et al., Case No. 2:11-cv-07119 (D.N.J. 2019). The Court found that plaintiff raised triable issues of fact regarding defendants’ selective offering of rebates, discounts, and other financing programs under the Robinson-Patman Act’s price discrimination provisions.
Middle District Of Florida Limits Statute Of Limitations Tolling Arguments For Alleged Output Restrictions In Milk Market
On January 16, 2019, Judge Brian J. Davis of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida issued an order granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Southeast Milk, Inc. et al., Case No. 3:15-cv-01143 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2019). The Court ruled that plaintiffs should not receive equitable tolling of the statute of limitations for fraudulent concealment, that only a limited subset of claims were eligible for class action tolling, and that other theories for the timeliness of plaintiffs’ claims depended on the jury’s determination of the facts.
United States Court Of Appeals For The Third Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment For Defendant Based On Plaintiff’s Failure To Show “Plus Factors” That Made Finding Of Conspiracy More Likely Than Not In Oligopolistic Market For The Sale Of Titanium Dioxide
On October 2, 2017, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit released a ruling affirming the decision by U.S. District Judge Richard G. Andrews of the District of Delaware to grant summary judgment to the defendant E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. on a Sherman Act, Section One claim alleging price fixing in the sale of titanium dioxide on the grounds that the plaintiff had not shown sufficient evidence of an “actual agreement to fix prices.” Valspar Corp. v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours and Co., No. 16-1345 (3d Cir. Sept. 14, 2017). Writing for the majority, Judge Hardiman rejected much of the plaintiffs’ proffered evidence of conspiracy because it established no more than conscious parallelism and interdependent conduct in an oligopolistic market, and was therefore insufficient to prove the essential element of an agreement as required by Section One. Also lacking, the Court found, was evidence of a “traditional conspiracy,” i.e., “proof that the defendants got together and exchanged assurances of common action or otherwise adopted a common plan even though no meetings, conversation, or exchanged documents are shown.” Id. at 11-12. This case illustrates the Third Circuit’s continuing practice of requiring a searching analysis of both the particular evidence and the market context in evaluating ambiguous evidence of conspiracy in Sherman Act cases, and reinforces the importance of carefully examining the relevant Circuit law in making forum choices.